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1 Introduction
Orthodox Christian theology is full of peculiar little puzzles of interest to logicians—
Can God create a stone so large that he cannot lift it? Can God know what it is
like to be ignorant? How can God be identical with the Father and be identical
with the Son, but the Father not be identical to the Son? How can free will
and God’s omniscience be compatible? Must that than which nothing greater
can be conceived exist? Must it exist necessarily? These puzzles (some might
call them paradoxes) challenge traditional approaches to logic because of the
crucial ways that they all involve some notion or conception of ‘contradiction’.
For instance, if God can do anything, then he can create anything, so he can
create a stone that he cannot lift. But because he is omnipotent, he can lift
any stone, including the stone so large he cannot lift it—a contradiction. A
notion central to orthodox Christian theology—the Trinity—patently seems to
contradict the laws of identity (which are often considered to be part of the laws
of logic itself).
A variety of different solutions can be (and have been) proposed to tackle
these contradictory or potentially-contradictory settings, but rarely in a way
that provides a global solution for all the problems. Instead, individual solutions
are propounded for each of the paralogisms.
The present paper is a response to Jc Beall’s “Christ—A Contradiction:
A Defense of Contradictory Christology”, in which Beall outlines a solution
to a particular theological problem—the problem of attributing contradictory
properties to Christ—that while being presented as a particular solution to a
particular problem can nevertheless be generalized to some (perhaps all!) of
the other “paradoxes” mentioned above. Beall’s aims in his paper are two-fold:
(1) “to illuminate the role that logic itself plays in theology” (p. 1) and (2) to
defend the view that “the true Christology is logically contradictory” is “both
viable and motivated” (p. 2), and that the only way to accomplish these two
aims is through the adoption of a logic that admits contradictions, that is, a
paraconsistent logic (and specifically, First-Degree Entailment, FDE).
Those who are familiar with Beall’s work as a logician will not be surprised
that this is the conclusion he reaches: He has long been an advocate for non-
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classical (and specifically sub-classical) logics where the classical rule of ex con-
tradictione sequitur quodlibet “from a contradiction anything follows” does not
hold. Non-theological reasons for adopting such paraconsistent, non-classical
logics are well rehearsed in other places (including Beall’s own paper presently
under discussion which provides many relevant references), and I will not spend
much time on advocating for—or against—them here.
Instead, my purpose in this short discussion piece is to address a topic that
he doesn’t explicitly address, namely, “What is a contradiction?”. Motivating
why this question is important, answering it, and showing the consequences of
the answer to Beall’s project will be the central contribution of my paper.
In addition to this, though, I will also take a closer look at how Beall ap-
proaches his two aims. First, I comment on what he says is the role of logic
within theories (theological or otherwise), and why—he thinks—this should lead
us to adopt a logic that allows us to admit contradictions. Then, I put the spot-
light on how logicians prior to Beall have dealt with these same issues in their
attempts to solve the Christological and other theological problems.1 These
issues—the relationship of logic to theology, and the ways in which we can ac-
cept classical Christology without devolving into irrationality or triviality—were
core issues considered by medieval European logicians in 12th–14th centuries,
and resolved in very similar ways. So we will in our investigation come to similar
conclusions: For what Beall has to say, in essence, is not new, even if the details
of his proposal are.
2 What is logic? The role and nature of logic
Before addressing the question of what the appropriate logic for reasoning about
theological paradoxes is, Beall says something about what logic is and what role
it is supposed to play (both in general and in theology). In his paper, Beall
tackles these problems in reverse: first he outlines what he sees to be the role
of logic, and then he goes on to say what logic in fact is. If this seems a bit
backwards to the present reader, they should know that they are not alone; for
in general we seek to identify what things are before we determine what their
use or purpose is.
Beall sees logic primarily as a tool for the generation and maintenance of
theories (scientific or otherwise). His account of the role of logic in theory gen-
eration and maintenance provides him with a rather narrow space into which he
can define logic so that it can fulfill that role. The purpose of logic according to
Beall is to identify what truths “follow from” other truths, given an explication
of “follows from” via the notion of a consequence relation, which leaves very
little space for what logic can be, if this is the role it is to play. Logic, according
to Beall, is
a very special consequence (entailment, closure) relation. Logic is
the common core of all (closed) theories; it is at the bottom of all
1Medieval attempts to reconcile the contradictions inherent in theology were not limited
to the Christological contradictions alone: These contradictions are a part of a broader range
of theological contradictions. There is nothing special or specific about the Christological
contradictions—any solution that works for them should also work for the other thorny the-
ological issues, and vice versa—and in fact it is these other problems that exercised medieval
logicians more than the Christological problems.
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the (extra-logical, theory-specific) consequence relations of our true
theories (p. 6),
where ‘consequence (entailment, closure) relation’ is taken in the way that Tarski
defined it (fn. 5), along with all the technical constraints that come along with
such a definition.
A brief aside: Beall argues that the importance of logic is that without the
consequence relation(s) given by logic, “our theories remain inadequate; they fail
to contain truths that are entailed by the given set of truths” (p. 6); that is, they
are incomplete (in the technical, logical sense of the word, in which every truth
can be derived from the theory). Two things to note about this: First, while it
is undeniably true that consequence relations are an important part of logic, it
doesn’t follow that this is the only thing logic is/does. It is also important to
note that this need not be the case; for one could simply adopt a theory that
contained every truth, relieving it of any need for an entailment or consequence
relation, since every truth entailed by some truth in the set would already be
in the set. But such a theory doesn’t come without a price: For without having
some entailment relation—or some other means of churning truths into other
truths—it is not clear how we could generate or enumerate the truths of our
theory. Such a system would be complete, but it would not be terribly useful.
Therefore, the reason why we need an entailment or consequence relation is so
that we can generate our set of truths from a finite—or finitary—set of basic
truths. End aside.
As a logician myself, I found Beall’s description of ‘logic’ rather peculiar, for
it does not resemble any definition of ‘logic’ that I would provide (although what
he defines as ‘logic’ is certainly a component of what I take logic to be, I do not
want to deny that). There are a few things that should be noted about defining
logic in this way. First, as noted above, if the role of logic in a given theory is to
explicate what are the non-theory-specific consequences of the initial truths of
the theory, then there is little else that logic could be other than the explication
of a consequence relation: Make the purpose or use of logic narrow, then logic
itself will have to be narrow enough to fit that purpose.
The upshot is that Beall’s presentation of ‘logic’ sets up something of a
strawman: What he describes as ‘logic’ is in fact an idiosyncratic version of
‘propositional logic’. This reflects a specific view about the ontological status of
logic. Beall clearly thinks of logic as an object of study, whereas a more fruitful
way to think about logic is as a field of study. The definition that Beall gives
is something that very few logicians would assent to, and requires a narrow,
monist view of logic—and even logical monists don’t think that propositional
logic is the epitome of logic. This narrow definition of logic falls out of a narrow
definition of its role or use. A broader account of the purpose of logic will allow
us to give an alternative, broader, account of what logic is.
There is another reason why should prefer an alternative account of logic.
If we look to the history of logic, it becomes clear that Beall’s very narrow con-
ception of ‘logic’, wherein it is nothing more than the most general consequence
relation available, makes much of what has been called logic in the past no longer
logic. (Some people might say this is a good thing; but one should worry about
the suitability of a definition of a phenomenon that excludes much of what has
historically been taken to be a part of that phenomenon, without some indepen-
dently motivated reason for excluding those other parts, and an explanation for
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why history has gotten things so badly wrong. Neither of these two things are
forthcoming in Beall’s paper, and in fact when he approaches some historical
questions raised in the “objections” section of his paper, attributing this narrow
view of what counts as logic to historical theologians leads him into problems,
as we’ll see below.)
Let us consider a specific historical account of the nature of logic, one that
does not resemble Beall’s definition very much at all, but typifies an approach to
logic that was dominant for more than a millennia and a half. Writing around
1250, Bacon says in his Art and Science of Logic that
logic, as a science, is the habit of distinguishing what is true from
what is false by means of rules or maxims or dignities by which we
can comprehend the truth of a locution through our own efforts or
with the help of others. And logic is so-called from ‘logos’, which
means discourse, and ‘lexis’, which means reason or understanding—
as it were, the science either of reason joined to discourse or of
discourse joined to reason [4, ¶3].
Bacon’s definition highlights four important features of (the study of) logic:
1. It is aimed at distinguishing truth from falsehood.
2. It is rule-governed.
3. It can be a joint venture.
4. It involves discourse.
This provides a much wider scope for what can—and should—count as logic,
which is determining truth using rule-governed methods, focusing on what is in
fact true, and built into a cooperative, dialogical setting. In what follows, what
we have to say about logic is to be placed against this more general conception:
Logic is a set of practices or activities which are truth-seeking—and thus involve
logical consequence—but also potentially involve other features.
With this alternative account of the nature of logic, I’d like to say a little
bit about how Beall views its role. Recall above that Beall thinks logic’s most
important purpose is to generate and maintain theories via a notion of “follows
from”, explicated in terms of a consequence relation. Interestingly, nowhere in
Bacon’s account is a notion of consequence or entailment or closure mentioned.
This is not merely because modern logicians have developed different terminol-
ogy than what Bacon used, but for a more pathological reason: because there
wasn’t yet a concept for some alternative terminology to pick out.2
This is because a general notion of “following from” or “what follows from
what” was something that was only first begun to be articulated in the 12th
century, and was still in the process of being articulated in the 13th and 14th
centuries. For many centuries logicians had been able to provide rules of infer-
ence governing limited sets of logical consequences (e.g., Aristotelian categorical
2Regardless of whether someone might respond to this point by saying “well, they should
have had this concept (of logical consequence), and if they didn’t, then they failed,” the
point still remains that the discipline of logic thrived for more than a millennia without an
articulation of the concept that Beall wants to identify with logic (and even when a general
concept of “following from” was articulated, this was still but a component of logic, not logic
in its entirety).
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syllogisms; limited propositional logic due to the Stoics; hypothetical syllogisms
in Boethius; etc.), but one of the remarkable aspects of the developments of
logic from the 12th century onwards is that they can be understood in the con-
text of people developing an understanding of a notion of “logical consequence”
broader than the syllogistic, and then attempting to codify an informal and not
well defined notion of “what follows from what”. Until one has a general notion
of logical consequence, in the sense that Beall wants to identify with ‘logic’, it
is impossible for this concept to play a substantive role in the generation of our
theories.
More importantly, the fact that a general notion of logical consequence or
entailment wasn’t developed until around the 12th century has substantial con-
sequences for some of the claims Beall makes in his paper. Throughout, Beall
speaks of “Conciliar Christology”, without ever being explicit what this is.
Christology is, of course, the study of the properties and actions of Christ;
but the “Conciliar” adjective derives from the grounding of these properties
and actions in the so-called “conciliar texts” (p. 2). These texts are the ones
that resulted from the ecclesiastical councils in the early Christian era, and
most specifically the Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chal-
cedon in the 4th and 5th centuries, where the Church Fathers set much of what
is considered orthodox theology today. Thus, when we move back to the era
of the ecumenical councils that first articulated the Contradictory Christology
that Beall is supporting, we are now many centuries before the medieval logical
developments we have been discussing.
When Beall asks:
Why would not the conciliar fathers not flag their special—and
undefined—usage of (for example) ‘incomprehensible’ and ‘compre-
hensible’. . . if they did not intend the usual entailment relations to
hold? (p. 26)
this rhetorical question anachronistically assumes that there was some sort of
“usual entailment relations” that the church fathers (a) were familiar with and
(b) intended to hold. But neither of these are warranted assumptions. Logic—in
both my and Beall’s use of the term—was simply not sufficiently developed the
time of the councils establishing these contradictory properties of Christ for us
to impute any sort of sophisticated logical understanding to the church fathers.
What sort of logic did the conciliar fathers know? That’s a question for
history and historians, and one that would take me out of the scope and space
of this paper to pursue. Instead, I’ll address a slightly different question, “what
sort of logic could the conciliar fathers have known?” Until the developments
of of the 12th century, the broad answer to this question is “Aristotle’s Prior
Analytics and De Interpretation, with some of the Stoics thrown in; that is, the
syllogistic, a system of logic which very narrowly prescribes what counts as an
argument and what follows from”; even Boethius’s commentaries post-date the
earliest ecumenical councils. None of the complex intricacies of reasoning that
Beall attributes to the Church Fathers later in his paper (cf. his response to
Objection 2, that his proposal is “hermeneutically suspect”) are plausible, but
instead reflect an anachronistic approach founded on two assumptions: (1) that
“logic” or even “consequence” was a relevant notion at the time these theologians
were articulating their claims, and (2) that this logic was identifiable with what
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we call logic nowadays (or, more narrowly, with how logic is defined in the
context of Beall’s paper).
Neither of these assumptions are plausible. The more likely reason that the
conciliar fathers did not flag their special usage of terms is not because they
intended ordinary entailment relations to hold but because they didn’t even
conceive that there could be something like entailment relations. Even if they
did know their Aristotle, there simply is nothing that corresponds to explosion in
the Aristotelian syllogistic3, and the idea that there was some well-known/well-
understood concept of ‘entailment’ that existed apart from the syllogistic is
simply unsupportable.
What you do get, though, in Aristotle, are views on the notion of contradic-
tion and contradictory opposition which are relevant here, and which we explore
in the next section.
3 What is a contradiction?
The central conclusion Beall is arguing for is that “Christology is in fact log-
ically contradictory, just as it appears to be” (p. 19). This is certainly quite
a bold claim, but it is not clear what, exactly, is meant by it. In the early
parts of Beall’s paper, “logically contradictory” is used in the way it is ordinar-
ily used by logicians when they use it without further specification—logically
contradictory according to the rules of classical logic. However, after FDE has
been introduced, it is not longer clear what counts as “logically contradictory”
according to FDE.
In this section, I want to explore different ways in which “contradiction” and
“(logically) contradictory” can be defined, formally and informally, as well as
how these ways are manifested in Beall’s paper.
The first systematic account of contradiction in western philosophy is found
in Aristotle, who discusses contradiction and non-contradiction in a variety of
places, including the Metaphysics, On Interpretation, and the Posterior Analyt-
ics [7]. The most detailed discussion is in the Metaphysics, in the context of what
is now known as the law or principle of non-contradiction.  Lukasiewicz identifies
three different ways that Aristotle formulates the law of non-contradiction, (a)
ontological, (b) logical, and (c) psychological, all in Metaphysics Γ [10, p. 487]:
a It is impossible that the same thing belong and not belong to the same thing
at the same time and in the same respect (Met. Γ 3. 1005b 19, 20.)
b The most certain of all basic principles is that contradictory propositions are
not true simultaneously (Met. Γ 6. 1011b 13, 14.)
c No one can believe that the same thing can (at the same time) be and not be
(Met. Γ 3. 1005b 23, 24.)
 Lukasiewicz points out that “None of the three formulations of the principle of
contradiction is identical in meaning with the others” [10, p. 489], and Couvalis
claims that Aristotle does not think that either (b) or (c) are the fundamental
versions of the principle, only (a) is [5, p. 37]. However, “the logical formulation
3Though the use of reductio ad absurdem to reduce Baroco and Bocardo to Barbara con-
tains the germ of EFQ
6
seems to be for Aristotle logically equivalent to the ontological formulation”
[10, p. 489], due to the correspondence between propositions and facts about
the world, so even if it is not the most fundamental version of the law, we can
still concentrate on it, rather than the ontological formulation which underpins
it, as it is logic that interests us most here.
However, whichever version of the law we adopt, it still remains that—
a law, and not a definition. The law governs the behavior of contradictory
propositions—if two propositions are contradictory (to each other), then they
are not true simultaneously—but leaves open the question of what, exactly, con-
tradictory propositions are (that is, it gives us a necessary, but not sufficient
condition). The law cannot be taken as a definition of contradictory proposi-
tions because defining contradictory propositions as those which are not true
simultaneously is incomplete, as the definition would lack the other property
traditionally ascribed to contradictory propositions, namely, that they are also
not simultaneously false. That is, we need to be able to distinguish contradictory
pairs from contrary pairs.
As a result, even though Metaphysics is widely agreed to be the place where
the most detailed discussions (and arguments in support) of the principle of non-
contradiction can be found in Aristotle, we must look elsewhere for a definition
of ‘contradiction’, namely, in the Prior Analytics:
An affirmation is a statement affirming something of something, a
negation is a statement denying something of something. . . It is clear
that for every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and for every
negation there is an opposite affirmation. . . Let us call an affirmation
and a negation which are opposite a contradiction [3, Categories,
17a25–35].
There are two ways that this definition can be understood: It can be understood
as operating at a syntactic level, where “affirmation” and “negation” are iden-
tifiable on the basis of their syntactic properties (for instance, whether or not
a negation is included, or whether the total number of negations is odd, rather
than even). However, the notion of opposition involved is not one of syntactic
structure but one of truth value. In the Categories, Aristotle says that in the
case of the opposition between contradictories,
and in this case only, it is necessary for the one to be true and the
other false [3, Categories, 13b2–3].
That is, for Aristotle, contradiction is fundamentally about opposition in truth
value: If two contradictory opposites are such that one must always be true
and the other false (that is, if contradictory opposites satisfy the principle of
non-contradiction, in its logical formulation, stated above, along with its corre-
lated principle, the law of excluded middle , then “a contradiction”, namely the
conjunction of two contradictory opposites, will always be false (assuming that
the truth of a conjunction requires the truth of all of its conjuncts).
The problem is that as soon as one admits of a truth value option other
than ‘true’ and ‘false’, Aristotle’s notion of contradictory opposition is no longer
straightforwardly applicable. For “no third type [of statement] is possible be-
cause of all four types of opposition [in Aristotle] the one of ‘affirmation and
negation’ excludes intermediates” [2, p. 96], and
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. . . of opposites only contradictories admit of no intermediate terms
(for contradiction is that kind of opposition in which either of its two
terms could be present in anything whatever); and this opposition
clearly has not intermediates [2, p. 96].
On the most uncharitable view, this means that as soon as we have more options
than just truth and falsity, the notion of contradiction goes out the window.
We could also be more charitable and say that as soon as we have more than
two options, the notion of contradiction needs to be revised; and if we were
to revise it in a way that most closely captures the essence of the Aristotelian
notion, then for any one of the two options we would need to select the one
that is “most opposite” of it; that is, “true” and “not true” would become
contradictory opposites, not “true” and “false”, since “true” and “false” are no
longer exclusive.
However, this is not what we see Beall doing when he tackles the concept
of contradiction. The issue of what counts as a contradiction arises in the
ninth objection, concerning the ubiquity of the law of non-contradiction. As
Beall notes, this ‘law’ is “notoriously ambiguous”, and he offers a variety of
ways that it might be precisified. Interestingly, none of these ways is the most
fundamental way the principle is expressed by Aristotle noted above, namely, the
metaphysical version wherein the law of non-contradiction implies exhaustivity:
No sentence is both true and false at the same time.
Beall never gives an explicit definition of what he means by ‘contradic-
tory’. In some places (e.g., p. 21), Beall glosses ‘contradictory’ as ‘negation-
inconsistent’; this is a technical term d’art of logic which he also does not define
or explain. There are two competing definitions of negation-inconsistency, one
semantic, and one proof-theoretic. On the semantic conception, a set of sen-
tences (i.e., a theory) S is negation-inconsistent if it has at least one model
that satisfies both some formula ϕ and its negation ¬ϕ.4 On the proof-theoretic
account, a set of sentences S is negation-inconsistent if there is some formula ϕ
such that both ϕ and ¬ϕ are theorems of S.5 Negation inconsistency is a weaker
form of inconsistency than absolute inconsistency, which is when a theory can
derive every formula in the language. Given a proof-system that is sound and
complete with respect to some classical semantics6, the semantic and the proof-
theoretic conceptions of negation-inconsistency collide; when the semantics are
non-classical, these two conceptions of negation-inconsistency can come apart.
Negation-inconsistent theories in the proof-theoretic sense are absolutely in-
consistent in the presence of a rule such as ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet
(ECQ):7,8
4The semantic conception, so defined, can be found in, inter alia, [11]. Note that even
the semantic definition relies on a syntactic component, namely the idea of the negation of a
formula being identified with the same formula with a ¬ prefixed to it.
5Sometimes the proof-theoretic account is defined as the presence of ϕ∧¬ϕ in a theory S for
some wff ϕ, e.g., in [14, p. 57]. This definition is equivalent to the one we have given when the
theories in question are closed under conjunction introduction and conjunction elimination,
or closed under modus ponens and containing the axiom ϕ→ (¬ϕ→ ψ).
6That is, where every sentence has exactly one truth value, either true or false.
7This result is due to Post in the 1920s [15, p. 177].
8Note that even though this rule has a Latin name, this name is not medieval. The usual
medieval description of the rule was ex impossibile sequitur quodlibet. The distinction between
contradictions and impossibilities is one we’ll return to below.
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ϕ ¬ϕ
ψ
as one can then take the theorem ϕ whose negation ¬ϕ is also a theorem and
use ECQ to derive every formula. The converse is trivially true; any absolutely
inconsistent theory is also negation-inconsistent, whether the system contains
ECQ or not.
While Beall does not give a precise definition of ‘contradictory’, beyond
‘negation-inconsistent’, he does define ‘contradiction’. Beall’s definition of a
contradiction is one that is syntactic, anything that is of the form “It is true
that p and it is false that p” for some proposition p, that is, the conjunction of
the assertion of the truth of a sentence along with the assertion of the falsity of
that very same sentence. (The use of the definition “the logical conjunction of
a sentences and its logical negation” occurs on p. 20). But as we’ve just seen in
discussing negation-inconsistency, this syntactic notion of a contradiction is not
the only possible one: and indeed, historically it has never been the primary one.
Follow Aristotle, “contradiction” is more fundamentally a primarily semantic
concept, with the syntactic notion of contradiction being dependent or parasitic
on the semantic notion.
This issue of whether ‘a contradiction’ or ‘contradictory’ is a semantic, syn-
tactic, or proof-theoretic notion comes up again in Beall’s response to Objection
1, that the proposal is “historically suspect”; his evidence for this is a quote of
a quote of Leo the Great who argued that “Jesus could be both impassible
and passible at the same time without there being any contradiction” (emphasis
Beall’s). If in the context of FDE, a contradiction is defined to be something
that is both at least true and at least false at the same time, then Jesus’s being
both impassible and passible would indeed not occur without contradiction—
assuming, of course, that being in the extension of ‘impassible’ implies being in
the antiextension of ‘passible’.
Beall’s reply, quite rightly, is to
Distinguish two senses of ‘contradiction’, one being a sentence which
is the logical conjunction of a sentence and its logical negation, and
the other being an ‘explosive sentence’, a sentence that, according to
a theory’s consequence or entailment relation, entails every sentence
(of the language of the theory) (p. 25).
The first sense of contradiction is the syntactic one: Any sentence conjoined to
its own negation is a contradiction. (This approach to defining ‘contradiction’ is
in keeping with Beall’s regular insistence that logic and logical consequence be a
matter of form—though recall the issue noted above about how he doesn’t take
that syntactic principle seriously when defining logical consequence.) Taking
‘impassible’ to be the negation of ‘passible’, then “Jesus is both passible and
impassible at the same time” can be rewritten into a syntactic contradiction,
and thus on this notion of contradiction, Leo’s statement cannot be maintained.
The second sense he distinguishes is semantic, defined in terms of the truth
value(s) the sentence has, as one that logically entails other sentence. Such
sentences will be ones which can never be true (for all—and only—such sentences
will entail every sentence in a theory). But since we haven’t yet been told
what counts as logical consequence or entailment on the FDE account, it is not
clear that “Jesus is both passible and impassible at the same time” is not a
contradiction on this sense.
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On a classical account of logic, everything that is a contradiction in the first
sense is also a contradiction in the second sense, as noted above; it is only on a
subclassical account of logic that these two senses can be fruitfully distinguished.
Beall says that it is the first sense which “is the one involved in the proposed
Contradictory Christology” (p. 25). The problem is that once we change the
underlying semantic notions, it is no longer the case that everything of the first
type is also of the second type, so we are left with the question of why is it that it
is the first type, the syntactic, that is a contradiction, and not the second type.
That is: Why do we say that on a subclassical account of logic, Contradictory
Christology is contradictory at all?
This issue of whether we are interested in a semantic—i.e., grounded in
truth—conception of inconsistency (and by extension contradictoriness) or what
is essentially syntactic—i.e., grounded in sentences and their negations—is at
the heart of my complaint concerning Beall’s account of contradiction. These
two approaches coincide in classical contexts. Once the classical principles of
exhaustion and exclusion are dropped, a clear definition of “contradiction”,
whether semantic or syntactic, needs to be given: “negation-inconsistent” with-
out further explication is not sufficient.
Under a semantic approach, contradictions cannot ever be true, and two
sentences are a pair of contradictory opposites if one of them being a certain
truth value implies that the other cannot have that truth value, and vice versa.
Since ϕ and ¬ϕ are contradictory opposites on classical semantics, we can say
that sentences of the syntactic form ϕ∧¬ϕ turn out to be contradictions, because
their truth conditions are such that they will never be true; but there are other
sentences which are also contradictory that don’t have this form, for example,
¬(ϕ ∨ ϕ). Thus, a semantic approach is more general than a syntactic one.
Again, once the classical principles of exhaustion and exclusion are dropped,
we must ask why it is that “It is true that p and it is false that p” are taken as
contradictory opposites, as opposed to “It is true that p and it is not true that
p. It is easy to be lulled into a false sense of security thinking that the former
captures “genuine” or “real” contradictoriness, rather than the latter, when in
fact, it is the latter that genuinely opposes two claims; only in the presence of
exclusion and exhaustion does the latter collapse into the former.
The issue is that when the semantic concepts of truth and falsity are rede-
fined (so that “at least true” plays the role of ‘true’ and “at least false” plays
the role of ‘false’), these definitions have to propagate down the through the
rest of the semantic concepts, including that of contradiction. If we retain the
semantic conception of contradiction, then by definition there is no such thing
as a true contradiction: A contradiction is defined to be that which is never
true. If we redefine truth and falsity so that they are not longer opposed, then
the contradictory of “it is true that p” is not going to be “it is false that p” but
rather “it is not true that p”.
Now, I’m sympathetic to the view that adopting this semantic conception of
contradiction might seem to be question begging against Beall’s position, and
that I should try to engage on the syntactic level, as he defines contradiction.
But even then, the semantic background cannot be wholly escaped.
If one wanted to retain a syntactic account of contradiction, the definition
still needs to be revised so that it adequately captures the genuine contradictori-
ness of contradictions: If ‘false’ is no longer contradictorially opposed to ‘true’,
then “It is true that p and it is false that p” no longer genuinely represents a
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contradiction (this is a different claim from what Beall is making, which is that
this is a contradiction, but one that at least in some cases can be true). A
genuine syntactic contradiction would be of the form “It is at least true that
p and it is not at least true that p” (only a slight variant from the revised se-
mantic definition we can two paragraphs earlier). This has the correct semantic
outcome—it is never even at least true—and retains the needed opposition be-
tween true and non-truth (it is an accident of classical logic that falsity turns
out to coincide with non-truth; but if we are going to reject the exhaustion and
exclusivity properties of classical logic, then we have to also reject the idea that
falsity is opposed to truth).
Even if one is not persuaded by the preceding, there is also evidence that
Beall’s account of contradiction is too narrow even according to his own views.
For instance, in §4.2, he discusses the Liar paradox:
X The ticked sentence is false.
and says that this is a “prima facie contradiction”: But it does not have the
right syntactic form, and so, taking Beall’s definition of contradiction at face
value, this shouldn’t be analysed as a contradiction. It appears that there must
be something else at play in the conception of contradiction that Beall is trying
to capture or refer to.
When Beall says that the tenets of Christology are contradictory, I suspect
that what he means is that they are contradictory in the semantic sense, in
that they are both “(at least) true” and “(at least) false” at the same time
(i.e., in the same model(s)). But as we’ve pointed out above, once we revise
the notions of truth and falsity, as Beall does in adopting FDE, it is no longer
clear that something being both “at least true” and “at least false” at the same
time is contradictory, at least, not in the Aristotelian sense of ‘contradictory’
(cannot both be true at the same time and cannot both be false at the same
time): The contradictory of “at least true” is not “at least false” but “not at
least true”. The result is that either Christology is not genuinely contradictory
on the account of logical consequence that Beall advocates, or if it is, then
switching to FDE doesn’t help solve anything.
4 Where to go from here
I don’t want to end on such a negative note, though, because I think that
the kernel of what Beall is trying to do in his paper is correct, even though it
doesn’t quite work. The reason I think it’s correct is because it’s one that is
at the heart of a number of systematic approaches to theological paradoxes and
puzzles throughout the history of logic. The difference is that instead of focusing
on the notion of contradiction, medieval logicians focused instead on possibility
and impossibility. In this section I’d like to return to some of these historical
solutions, and show how they relate to what we said about the development of
a general notion of logical consequence from the 12th century on in §2.
Early medieval work on the general theoretical concept of “logical conse-
quence” tends to be rooted in Aristotelian principles, even if not necessarily
Aristotelian logic. Two commonly cited principles are that “from the possible
nothing impossible follows” and the possible is “that which is not necessary but,
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being assumed, results in nothing impossible”.9,10 The first of these is a neces-
sary claim about logical consequence, but not a sufficient one, and the second
is a definition of a term in the former. When these two principles are combined
with the imperative that “something possible must be conceded in order to see
what follows from it”, we then have a mechanism that we can use to help deter-
mine what follows from what, and therefore to step closer to a general account
of logical consequence. In fact, perhaps the easiest way to understand what
is going on in early treatises in the otherwise mysterious genre of obligationes
disputations is that they are attempts to work out a rigorous notion of logical
consequence that respects these principles.
Note here the central role that possibility and impossibility play. These are
two notions that greatly exercised medieval logicians in large part because of
their connections with theological puzzles. There are many things which seem
impossible (or are impossible given the natural order of things, but which in
the presence of God’s omnipotence are rendered no longer impossible. This led
medieval philosophers to distinguish between different types (or grades) of pos-
sibilities and impossibilities, with some impossibilities being “more impossible”
(taking this loosely!) than others. For instance, certain things are impossible
according to the laws of nature, but yet nevertheless can still be understood or
imagined. That which is impossible according to nature but possible accord-
ing to imagination can be said to be “less impossible” than something which is
impossible both according to nature and according to imagination.
Early treatises argue that it should be possible to reason from impossibilities
in a principled and non-trivial way. As the anonymous author of a treatise on
reasoning from impossible statements11 puts it:
something impossible can be understood, for he [Aristotle] talks
about taking a fish from the water so that nothing assumes its
place—which is impossible. Hence it is possible to understand some-
thing impossible. Therefore, since we can posit that that which we
can understand, it is clear that an impossible positio must be ac-
cepted and something impossible must be conceded [1, p. 217].12
The fact that it is possible to maintain a negation-inconsistent theory with-
9For instance, in the anonymous treatise discussed below (cf. fn. 11), the author says that
Just as we say that something possible must be conceded in order to see what
follows from it, similarly we have it from Aristotle that something impossible
must be conceded in order to see what happens then” [1, p. 217]; sicuti enim nos
dicimus quod possibile est concedendum ut videatur quid inde sequitur, similiter
habemus ab Aristotile quod impossibile est concedendum ut videtur quid inde
accidat [6, p. 117].
Because it is possible to understand something impossible, it is also possible to posit some-
thing impossible, and this is the author’s justification for considering positio impossibilis as a
legitimate genre.
10Though various authors attribute this principle to Aristotle, in truth no such principle has
been identified in Aristotle; the most similar statement is found in Boethius’s De Hypotheticis
Syllogismis, attributed to Eudemus, cf. [12, p. 64].
11This treatise is found in MS CLM 14 458, edited and dated to the first half of the
thirteenth century by de Rijk [6], who calls it Tractatus Emmeranus de Positio Impossibilis.
An English translation appears in [1].
12Quod impossibile potest intellegi. Dicit enim quod piscis extrahatur ab aqua, ita quod
nichil subintret locum eius,—quod est impossibile—, ita impossibile potest intelligi. Ergo cum
possumus ponere illud quod possimus intelligere, patet quod impossibilis positio est recipienda
et impossibile est concedendum [6, p. 118].
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out collapsing into triviality (absolute inconsistency) was well-known to the later
medieval logicians, who in the 12th century questioned the legitimacy of both
the principles ex impossibile quodlibet and ad necessarium quodlibet, with the
Parvipontanae13 accepting the principles while Peter Abelard and the so-called
Nominales rejected them. The anonymous treatise quoted above singles out the
“Adamite” thesis by name in order to identify it as unacceptable in the context
of admitting impossible premises:
And we should note that in this question everything does not follow
from an impossible obligation. Thus, in this question one must not
concede the consequence of the Adamites—namely that from the
impossible anything follows [1, p. 218].14
Note the use of “impossible” rather than “contradictory” here: One place where
medieval logicians were ahead of much of their modern counterparts was in the
recognition of different types, or grades, of impossibility, some of which are more
pathological than others (the most pathological being the strictly, syntactically,
contradictory, the conjunction of a sentence and its negation).
These different grades of possibility and impossibility were intimately tied
to theological questions, specifically questions concerning God’s abilities, such
as whether he could make a goat-stag (an animal that participates essentially
in two different species), a metaphysical impossibility.
Their approach to the problem of theological impossibilities was therefore
twofold: to recognize that not all impossibilities are contradictions and then,
in the presence of strict syntactic contradictions—the conjunction of a sentence
and its negation—to weaken the inference rules so as to prevent trivialization.
Two things are remarkable about this approach. The first is how much it
resembles the strategy that Beall himself uses in his paper, by identifying ways in
which we can accept apparent “contradictions” without trivializing logic. The
second is how the medieval approach avoids some of the concerns that we’ve
raised with Beall’s tactics: Whereas Beall focuses on the notion of contradiction,
medieval authors separated contradictions and impossibilities, admitting that
the former are always the latter, but the latter are not always the former. We
can than develop rules of entailment wherein not everything follows from an
impossibility (removing that route to trivialization) and only the conjunction
of genuine contradictory opposites entails everything. Combining this latter
prong with the fact that in a non-binary-valued logic, “truth” is no longer
contradictorially opposed to “falsity”, we can then take full advantage of all the
benefits that FDE gives us.
References
[1] Anonymous. The Emmeran treatise on impossible Positio. In
M. Yrjo¨nsuuri, editor, Medieval Formal Logic, pages 217–223. Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, 2001.
13The followers of Adam de Petit-Pont (Adam Parvipontanus, Adam of Balsham), who
taught in Paris in the middle of the 12th C [13].
14Et notandum quod in hac questione ex obligatione impossibili non sequitur quidlibet. Unde
consequentia Adamitorum non est concedenda in hac questione, scilicet quod ex impossibili
sequitur quidlibet [6, p. 118].
13
[2] John Peter Anton. Aristotle’s Theory of Contrariety. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1957.
[3] Aristotle. Categories and De Interpretatione. Oxford: Clarendon, 1963. J.
N. Ackrill (ed.).
[4] Roger Bacon. The Art and Science of Logic. Pontifical Institute of Medieval
Studies, 2009. Trans. by Thomas S. Maloney.
[5] George Couvalis. Aristotle on non-contradiction. In M. Rossetto,
M. Tsianikas, G. Couvalis, and M. Palaktsoglou, editors, Greek Research
in Australia: Proceedings of the Eighth Biennial International Conference
of Greek Studies, Flinders University June 2009, pages 36–43. Adelaide:
Flinders University Department of Languages—Modern Greek, 2009.
[6] L. M. de Rijk. Some thirteenth century tracts on the game of obligation.
Vivarium, 12:94–123, 1974.
[7] Paula Gottlieb. Aristotle on non-contradiction. In Edward N. Zalta,
editor, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/sum2015/entries/aristotle-noncontradiction, sum-
mer edition, 2015.
[8] Edward Grant. The condemnation of 1277, God’s absolute power, and
physical thought in the late Middle Ages. Viator, 10:211–244, 1979.
[9] Edward Grant. The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
[10] Jan Lukasiewicz and Vernon Wedin, trans. On the principle of contradiction
in Aristotle. Review of Metaphysics, 24(3):485–509, 1971.
[11] Joa˜o Marcos. Nearly every normal modal logic is paranormal. Logique et
Analyse, 48(189/192):279–300, 2005.
[12] Christopher J. Martin. Obligations and liars. In M. Yrjo¨nsuuri, editor,
Medieval Formal Logic, pages 63–94. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
[13] Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, editor. Twelfth Century Logic: Texts and Stud-
ies, volume I: Adam Balsamiensis Parvipontani. Ars disserendi (Dialectica
Alexandri). Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1956.
[14] Gemma Robles. Extensions of the basic constructive logic for negation-
inconsistency BKc4 defined with a falsity constant. Logique et Analyse,
new series, 51(201):57–80, 2008.
[15] John Woods. Truth in Fiction: Rethinking Its Logic. Springer, 2018.
14
